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On the Choice of R&D Organization 
 
Abstract: This paper seeks to examine, in the context of Marjit (1991, Eco. Lett.) and 
Mukherjee and Marjit (2004, Gr. Dec. Nego.) models, the effect on the choice of R&D 
organization if the number of research lab is chosen by the firms optimally under R&D 
cooperation. Given the optimal form of R&D cooperation, the paper further studies the effect 
of introducing fee licensing under non-cooperative R&D. We show that our results 
substantially differ from those in the existing literature. The R&D cost, the success probability, 
and the size of innovation, all these play a crucial role.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on research and development (R&D) discusses incentives of firms to invest in 
research. Often R&D involves a huge expenditure, but the firms even after investment do not 
know for sure whether success in R&D will come or not. This means R&D results are uncertain. 
Moreover, the firms have the problem of appropriating profits due to spillovers, imitation and 
diffusion of R&D outcomes in the backdrop of imperfect patent protection. Which market 
structure prevails is another important consideration for R&D incentives and investment.1 
While under non-cooperative R&D the innovating firm emerges as a monopolist (subject, 
however, to the appropriability problem), under cooperative R&D the firms can share R&D 
costs, output and uncertainty depending on the form of cooperation, and also can internalize 
the spillovers of R&D. Hence the choice of R&D organization, namely, the choice between 
cooperative and non-cooperative R&D, is an important consideration in the context of R&D 
investment. 
While Katz (1986) finds that the competing firms have incentives to cooperate so as to share 
R&D expenses and results, the pioneering contribution on the choice between cooperative and 
non-cooperative R&D is made by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The paper considers a 
duopoly with homogeneous goods, wherein the firms interact in research and final production. 
The paper highlights the role of spillovers in the choice of R&D organization. Kamien et al. 
(1992) has extended the model to the case of differentiated duopoly when there are several 
forms of R&D.2  Suzumura (1992) has extended d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to the 
case of oligopoly with more general spillover assumption, and Amir et al. (2003) consider the 
problem with endogenous spillovers. 
That uncertainty alone can be a source of R&D cooperation has been first drawn attention by 
Marjit (1991). Then Marjit (1991) results are examined in a number of papers. In his paper 
cooperative research is preferred to non-cooperative research for all low and high probability 
of success and non-cooperative R&D is chosen for intermediate success probabilities. Combs 
(1992) has introduced multiple research projects and has shown that cooperative research will 
occur only for high probability of success.3 Kabiraj (2007) has introduced patent protection in 
                                                          
1 See Arrow (1962), Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Yi (1999), Belleflamme and Vergari (2011) and Shibata (2014).  
2 In Kamien et al. (1992), the R&D activity takes the form of R&D competition, R&D cartel, RJV competition, 
or RJV cartel. They have d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework with differentiated products. 
3 The Combs (1992) model is framed in such a way that the probability of success under cooperative research is 
twice that under non-cooperative R&D. 
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the context of Marjit (1991) to show that Combs (1992) result is just reversed if R&D 
investment is small, but Marjit (1991) result will reappear if R&D cost is large (but not too 
large). Then Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) have introduced technology transfer to study how it 
affects the choice of R&D organization when the firms do cooperative research either in a 
single lab or in both labs. Doing research in a single lab means that the firms share both R&D 
costs and results (this is RJV), but doing research in both labs means that the firms do research 
in both labs independently and simultaneously although they share R&D results of each lab. 
Recently, Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2015), and Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2015) have 
examined the choice of R&D organization in the context of Marjit (1991) by introducing 
incomplete information about R&D results. 
The present paper is an extension of Marjit (1991) and Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) to the case 
when the R&D cooperating firms decide optimally whether they will do cooperative research 
in a single lab or in both of their labs. Thus the present paper seeks to examine, in the context 
of the above two models, the effect on the choice of R&D organization when the number of 
research labs is chosen optimally by the research cooperation. Then given the optimal choice 
of R&D cooperation, the paper further studies the effect of introducing technology licensing 
under non-cooperative research, hence it evaluates the results of Mukherjee and Marjit (2004).4 
We find that our results are substantially different from those in the existing literature. 
In terms of addressing the problem, our paper is very close to Mukherjee and Marjit (2004), 
but to understand the contribution of our paper in the literature vis-à-vis theirs, we must take 
note of the differences between these two papers. 
First, Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) have addressed the problem in Combs (1991) framework, 
whereas the present paper considers Marjit (1991) framework. In Marjit (1991), given R&D 
investment, each research lab is assumed to have a probability of success, 𝜌 ( 0 < 𝜌 < 1),  
independent of the R&D investment level. On the other hand, Combs (1992) considers a very 
specific research process. It assumes that there are 𝑛 research projects, out of which only one 
project can yield successful outcome, and that in a single lab only one research project can be 
executed. Therefore, the probability of success under non-cooperative research is 𝜌 =
1
𝑛
. Since 
under research cooperation the firms operate two projects (chosen without replacement) 
simultaneously, one in each research lab, the probability of success under R&D cooperation is 
                                                          
4 Some technology transfer papers directly relevant to the present work are Katz and Shapiro (1985), Marjit (1990) 
and Wang (1998). 
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therefore 2𝜌. But if in Marjit (1991) framework cooperative research occurs in two labs, 
effectively the probability of success becomes 𝜌(2 − 𝜌); the reason is that under research 
cooperation each firm will come up with the innovation if at least one lab yields success. Thus, 
compared to non-cooperative R&D, the probability of success under cooperation is larger in 
both models when research occurs in both labs, but for completely different reasons. It may 
further be noted that when the firms do research in both labs under cooperation, the probability 
of getting success in R&D in Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) is larger than that of ours. Therefore, 
their results are biased in favor of cooperative R&D.  
Second, and what is most important, in Mukherjee and Marjit (2004), whether the firms under 
cooperative research will do research in a single lab or both labs, is never a consideration. Their 
paper simply examines whether R&D will be cooperative or non-cooperative given that 
cooperative research occurs in a single lab or in both labs. In our paper the choice of optimal 
cooperative form is crucial to determine ultimately the choice of R&D organization. Hence, in 
our paper the firms first decide whether they will do cooperative research or non-cooperative 
research; then if it is cooperative research, they decide whether it will occur in a single lab or 
in both labs. Finally, as in other papers, they play Cournot game in the product market. In the 
analysis when we include the possibility of technology transfer, the firms under non-
cooperative R&D decide, before product market competition, whether they will write a 
technology transfer agreement, ex post innovation. Note that under cooperative R&D, since 
both firms have always symmetric technologies, there is no possibility of technology transfer.   
Finally, it should be noted that they have derived all results based on linear demand function. 
Instead, we have taken reduced form expressions of the payoffs. Hence our results are not 
constrained by any specific form of demand function, although we have illustrated our results 
for linear demand function. Since in our model the choice between cooperative and non-
cooperative R&D is conditional on the choice of optimal form of cooperative research, we 
claim that our results are more sensible and enriched. 
In the following section we present the model. Considering Marjit (1991) model as the 
benchmark case we see how Marjit (1991) results be affected with the inclusion of the optimal 
form of cooperation. In section 3 we introduce technology transfer to see the choice of R&D 
organization given that the R&D cooperation decides optimally whether to do research in a 
single lab or in both labs of the firms. Finally, section 4 summarizes the results and concludes 
the paper.   
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2. Model 
We consider Marjit (1991) framework. Two firms interact at the research stage and production 
stage. In the first stage the firms decide whether they will do cooperative research or non-
cooperative research, and if it is cooperative research, they decide the form of cooperation, that 
is, whether to do research in a single lab or in both labs; then they act accordingly. In the second 
stage they play a Cournot game subject to the outcome of the first stage. Initially the firms have 
symmetric technology given by a constant marginal cost of producing a homogeneous good. 
Now consider process innovation that reduces unit cost of production by a finite amount (say, 
𝜀 > 0) if R&D efforts are successful. The corresponding R&D cost is 𝑅 > 0, and the 
probability of success in R&D by a research lab is 𝜌, 0 < 𝜌 < 1, independent of the R&D cost; 
thus, given 0 < 𝜌 < 1, there is uncertainty in the realization of R&D outcome. 
We consider that under cooperative R&D, the firms write a contract on ex ante sharing R&D 
results. In Marjit (1991), under research cooperation firms do R&D in a single lab sharing both 
R&D costs and output. But we allow the research cooperation to decide whether the firms will 
do R&D in a single lab or in both labs of the firms. Hence when research occurs in both labs, 
the firms can share the knowledge if either of the labs is successful to innovate. This means the 
probability that a firm will come up with the innovation is larger compared to the case when 
the firms do research in a single lab. On the other hand, in case of doing R&D in a single lab, 
the firms share the R&D costs also. Thus there is a trade-off between the likelihood of the 
superior production technology and R&D costs.    
We include the possibility of technology transfer under non-cooperative R&D, ex post 
innovation, from the low-cost firm to the high cost firm. In Marjit (1991), innovation is 
assumed to be ` drastic’ in the sense that when only one firm is successful to innovate, it emerges 
as a monopolist, hence under the assumption of `drastic’ innovation, the possibility of 
technology transfer does not arise (or at least it has no special bite), assuming that the firms 
produce perfectly substitute goods. Hence in the present paper we assume non-drastic 
innovation yielding the post-innovation market structure to be always duopoly. Then under 
non-cooperative R&D if only one firm comes up with the low cost technology, the firm under 
consideration will explore the possibility of technology transfer to the high cost firm.  
Irrespective of whether research is cooperative or non-cooperative, when both firms use 
superior technology, the second stage market operated payoff of each firm is denoted by 𝜋𝑆𝑆, 
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and if both use the old technology in production, their corresponding payoff will be  𝜋𝐹𝐹 . In 
case of asymmetric duopoly, when one firm has superior technology and the other has inferior 
technology, their payoffs are respectively  𝜋𝑆𝐹  and  𝜋𝐹𝑆.5 Clearly, under Cournot competition, 
𝜋𝑆𝐹 > 𝜋𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝐹𝐹 > 𝜋𝐹𝑆                                                                       (1) 
2.1 Benchmark Case: Marjit (1991) Model 
Let us consider the Marjit (1991) model as the benchmark case with the modification that 
innovation is drastic, but as in Marjit (1991), consider cooperative R&D in a single lab, sharing 
both costs and research output, and that under non-cooperative R&D no technology transfer is 
allowed. Then the expected payoffs under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D are 
respectively given by 
 𝐸𝜋(𝐶) = 𝜌𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜋𝐹𝐹 −
𝑅
2
 ≡ 𝐸(𝐶1)                                                       (2)  
and 
𝐸𝜋(𝑁𝐶) = 𝜌2𝜋𝑆𝑆 +  𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆) + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅 ≡ 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1)     (3) 
Then cooperative R&D is preferred to non-cooperative R&D if and only if 
𝐸(𝐶1) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1)    ⟺     𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2𝐴
                                                 (4) 
where 
  𝐴 =[𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 − 𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝐹]   
and we have assumed that 𝐴 > 0.6 
Then Marjit (1991) results can be restated as follows. 
                                                          
5 Here  the superscript  𝑆 stands for `success’ and 𝐹 for `failure’. 
6 We must have 𝐴 > 0 for the linear demand function. To show this, define 𝑥 = 𝑓(𝜀); then for Cournot duopoly 
output 𝑞(𝑥), Cournot profit of a firm is 𝜋(𝑥) = [𝑞(𝑥)]2. Hence, 𝜋𝑆𝐹 = 𝜋(2𝜀), 𝜋𝑆𝑆 = 𝜋(𝜀), 𝜋𝐹𝐹 = 𝜋(0), and 
𝜋𝐹𝑆 = 𝜋(−𝜀). Clearly, 𝜋(𝑥)  function is strictly increasing and strictly convex, therefore, 𝜋𝑆𝐹 − 𝜋𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝐹𝐹 −
𝜋𝐹𝑆, hence 𝐴 > 0. Note that if innovation is drastic, then 𝜋𝑆𝐹 = 𝜋𝑚 (monopoly payoff) and 𝜋𝐹𝑆 = 0. In this case, 
necessarily 𝐴 > 0. 
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Proposition 1 (Marjit, 1991): If 𝑅 is not very large (i.e., 
𝑅
2𝐴
<
1
4
), then ∃ 𝜌 ̃& ?̂?, 0 < 𝜌 ̃ < ?̂? <
1, such that cooperative R&D is preferred to non-cooperative R&D ∀𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1) ; 
otherwise, non-cooperative R&D is preferred.  
In the next subsection we first consider the optimal form of R&D cooperation, that is, whether 
cooperative research will be conducted in a single lab or in both labs. Then we examine, without 
the possibility of technology transfer, whether R&D will be cooperative or non-cooperative. 
2.2 Optimal Form of Cooperative Research vs. Non-cooperative Research 
When the research cooperation decides to do research in a single lab, the firms share both R&D 
costs and R&D results. Hence the expected payoff of each firm under this situation is given by  
𝐸(𝐶1) (see Eqn. (2)). But when the research cooperation conducts research in two labs 
simultaneously but allows the firms to share the knowledge of each other, this means each firm 
comes up with the innovation if at least one lab is successful to innovate. Hence the expected 
payoff of each firm under this situation is: 
  𝐸(𝐶2) =  𝜌(2 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅                                          (5) 
Then the optimal form of cooperative research will be doing research in a single lab or in both 
labs according as: 
𝐸(𝐶1) ≷ 𝐸(𝐶2)    ⟺     
𝑅
2𝐵
≷ 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)                                                 (6) 
where 
  𝐵 = [𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝐹] > 0   
Clearly, the inequality in (6) can go in either direction (provided that 𝑅 is not very large). 
Therefore, whether cooperative research will occur in a single lab or in both labs, depends on 
the value of the probability of success. 
Lemma 1: Suppose 
𝑅
2𝐵
<
1
4
. Then ∃ 𝜌 & 𝜌, 0 < 𝜌 < 𝜌 < 1, such that ∀𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌)Ս(𝜌, 1) the 
firms will do cooperative research in a single lab and ∀𝜌 𝜖 (𝜌, 𝜌) they will do in both labs. 
Now consider the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative research, given that the 
research cooperation chooses the optimal form of R&D cooperation. 
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First note that  
𝐴 ≷ 𝐵    ⟺     𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 ≷ 2𝜋𝑆𝑆                                                        (7) 
The LHS of the inequality is the asymmetric duopoly industry profit whereas the RHS is the 
symmetric duopoly industry profit with both firms using superior technology. So the inequality 
in (7) can go in either direction depending on the size of innovation (𝜀). It can be shown for the 
linear demand function (and also with some restriction for the general demand function) that7 
  ∃𝜀0 |  𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆 ≷ 2𝜋𝑆𝑆   ⟺   ε ≷ 𝜀0                                                (8) 
We have the following two cases to consider the choice between cooperative and non-
cooperative research. 
Case 1:  𝝆(𝟏 − 𝝆) >
𝑹
𝟐𝑩
 ,  i.e.,   𝝆 𝝐  (𝝆 , 𝝆)  
Given Lemma 1, in this case if the firms do cooperative research, then research will be 
conducted in both research labs simultaneously. This will yield an expected payoff of a firm 
given by 𝐸(𝐶2) (see (5)). When this is compared with the expected payoff under non-
cooperative research (i.e., 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1)), we have   
𝐸(𝐶2) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1)    iff    2𝜋𝑆𝑆 >  𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆                                      (9) 
The above holds if and only if ε < 𝜀0 (see (8)). Hence we can write the following result. 
Proposition 2: Given  𝜌(1 − 𝜌) >
𝑅
2𝐵
 ,  (i.e.,  𝜌 𝜖  (𝜌 , 𝜌)), cooperative R&D will occur if the 
size of the innovation is small (i.e., 𝜀 < 𝜀0), but non-cooperative R&D will occur for large 
innovation (i.e., 𝜀 > 𝜀0). 
This result shows that for the choice of R&D organization not only the success probability is 
important but also the size of the innovation is crucial to determine the form of research.8 
Case 2:  𝝆(𝟏 − 𝝆) <
𝑹
𝟐𝑩
 ,  i.e.,   𝝆 𝝐  (𝟎, 𝝆)Ս( 𝝆, 𝟏)  
                                                          
7 See Marjit (1990) and Wang (1998). 
8 In Kabiraj (2007), the size of the innovation determines the R&D investment under each of cooperative and non-
cooperative research, hence the R&D institution. 
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Here under cooperative R&D, research will occur in a single lab, and this will yield an expected 
payoff of  𝐸(𝐶1) to each firm. We have already shown in the previous sub-section that, 
𝐸(𝐶1) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶1)    iff    
𝑅
2𝐴
> 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)                                                 
and that the above inequality holds for all  𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1) (see (4) and Proposition 1). But 
in the present subsection the number of research lab is a choice variable and therefore the above 
inequality is subject to the condition that 𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2𝐵
. We shall consider the following two 
subcases. 
Subcase (i):  ε > ε0, i.e., the size of the innovation is large. In this case 𝐴 > 𝐵 (see (7) and 
(8)), hence 
𝑅
2𝐴
<
𝑅
2𝐵
 . This means, ρ ̃ < ρ  and ?̂? > ρ . 
Proposition 3(a): Suppose 
𝑅
2𝐵
<
1
4
 . Then cooperative R&D (with research in a single lab) is 
preferred to non-cooperative R&D for all 𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1), and non-cooperative research for 
all 𝜌 𝜖 (𝜌 ,̃ 𝜌)Ս(𝜌, ?̂?). 
Subcase (ii):  ε < ε0, i.e., the size of the innovation is small. In this case 𝐴 < 𝐵, hence 
𝑅
2𝐴
>
𝑅
2𝐵
. This means, ρ ̃ > ρ  and ?̂? < ρ . Therefore, we have the following result. 
Proposition 3(b): Suppose 
𝑅
2𝐴
<
1
4
 . Then cooperative R&D (with research in a single lab) is 
preferred to non-cooperative R&D for all 𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌) Ս ( 𝜌, 1). 
The results of this section can be summarized in the following table (Table 1). 
Table 1: The choice of R&D organization (with no technology transfer) 
 
𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2𝐵
 
i.e.,   𝜌 𝜖  (0, 𝜌)Ս ( 𝜌, 1) 
 
𝜌(1 − 𝜌) >
𝑅
2𝐵
 
i.e.,   𝜌 𝜖  (𝜌 , 𝜌) 
 
𝜀 > 𝜀0 
(i.e., 𝐴 > 𝐵) 
 
 
Coop. R&D for 𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1) 
 
Non-coop. R&D for 𝜌 𝜖 (ρ ,̃ ρ)Ս(ρ, ?̂?) 
 
 
 
Non-Coop. R&D 
 
𝜀 < 𝜀0 
(i.e., 𝐴 < 𝐵) 
 
Coop. R&D for  ρ ϵ  (0, ρ)Ս( ρ, 1) 
 
Coop. R&D 
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We can now compare our results with those of Marjit (1991) and Mukherjee and Marjit (2004). 
When cooperative research is conducted in a single lab, both Marjit (1991) and Mukherjee and 
Marjit (2004) have shown that the interacting firms will go for cooperative R&D if and only if  
𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1) and non-cooperative R&D for 𝜌 𝜖 (𝜌 ̃, ?̂?). We have, however, allowed the 
research cooperation to choose the number of research lab optimally. In particular, we have 
shown that under cooperation research will occur in a single lab for all ρ ϵ (0, ρ)Ս(ρ, 1), 
otherwise it will be conducted in  both labs. Thus we have shown that, as in Marjit (1991) and 
Mukherjee and Marjit (2004), if the probability of success in R&D is either small or large, 
cooperative R&D is preferred to non-cooperative R&D irrespective of the size of the 
innovation, but in our paper the size of the innovation determines the exact interval of 
probability for choosing cooperative R&D. When the probability of success is in the 
intermediate range, contrary to Marjit (1991), non-cooperative R&D is to be preferred to   
cooperative R&D provided that the size of the innovation is large; otherwise cooperative R&D 
is to be chosen. Hence the size of the innovation is important in the choice of optimal R&D 
organization. In their papers cooperative R&D is chosen when the success probability is large, 
but in our paper, for large 𝜌, R&D will not occur in both labs under cooperation. 
3. The Choice of R&D Organization under Technology Transfer 
We have already noted that in Marjit (1991) model, innovation size is assumed to be large so 
that when only one firm succeeds in R&D, it emerges as a monopolist. Under this situation 
possibility of technology transfer will not arise. In the present paper we have assumed that 
innovation is non-drastic or `minor’. Then in a situation when only one firm comes up with the 
innovation, in the production stage the firms have asymmetric technologies. Hence there is a 
possibility of technology transfer from the low cost to the high cost firm, and when profitable 
the firms will strike a technology transfer deal. This is ex post information sharing under non-
cooperative R&D. In contrary, under cooperative R&D the firms write a contract on sharing 
the research result whoever is successful in R&D, and this occurs irrespective of whether R&D 
occurs in a single lab or in both labs. Therefore, cooperative R&D implies ex ante information 
sharing. Clearly, under non-cooperative research when both firms fail to succeed or both are 
successful, the question of technology transfer will not arise. 
12 
 
Now it is easy to understand that if at the production stage the firms possess asymmetric 
technologies, there always exists a profitable royalty licensing contract where the low cost firm 
charges a (quantity based) royalty equal to the unit cost difference of the firms. In this case in 
the post-transfer situation the licensee gets the same payoff as before, but the licensor enhances 
its profit by means of royalty income. 
In the context of the problem of the present paper, it is more interesting to study the case of fee 
licensing where technology is licensed against a fixed fee.9 It is easy to show that fee licensing 
is profitable if and only if the post-licensing industry profit is larger than the pre-transfer 
industry profit, i.e., 2𝜋𝑆𝑆 >  𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝜋𝐹𝑆. We have already noted that this condition will be 
satisfied if and only if the size of the innovation is not large, i.e., ε < ε0 (see (8)). Therefore, if 
ε > ε0, there will be no technology transfer under the fee contract, hence the analysis will 
degenerate to the previous section (in particular, see the analysis of Case (1) and subcase (i) of 
Case 2).10 
So in this section, to see the effect of ex post knowledge sharing under non-cooperative research 
we restrict to fee licensing and ε < ε0 (i.e., innovation size is small). Later we discuss the 
possible consequence if royalty licensing is also an option for the innovator.11  
Assumption: ε < ε0 i.e., innovation size is below a critical level.  
Under this situation the firm which comes up with the innovation transfers its technology to 
the other firm and extracts, by means of fee licensing, all surplus. Therefore, the expected 
payoff of a firm under non-cooperative research with technology transfer is:  
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) = 𝜌2𝜋𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)( 𝜋𝑆𝐹 + 𝐿) + (1 − 𝜌)𝜌 𝜋𝐹𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅 
where 𝐿 is the license fee given by 𝐿 = 𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝐹𝑆. Hence we have  
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) =  𝜌(2 − 𝜌)𝜋𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝜋𝐹𝐹 − 𝑅                                                 (10) 
                                                          
9 In fact, there are cases where the firms cannot write a royalty contract. See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and 
Mukherjee (2001). 
10 To recall the results, when ε > ε0, cooperative R&D will be chosen for all 𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌 ̃)Ս(?̂?, 1)  and non-
cooperative R&D for all   𝜌 𝜖 (ρ ,̃ ?̂?) (see Table 1). 
11 In fact, when both fee and royalty licensing are available to the patent holder, royalty licensing will strictly 
dominate fee licensing from the perspective of the patentee (see Wang (1998)). 
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Now, first consider the situation when cooperative research occurs in a single lab. This happens 
if 𝜌(1 − 𝜌) <
𝑅
2𝐵
  (i.e.,  ρ ϵ  (0, ρ)Ս ( ρ, 1) ). Then comparing 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) and 𝐸(𝐶1),  
𝐸(𝐶1) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2)    iff    
𝑅
2𝐵
> 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)                                              (11) 
Proposition 4(a): Given the possibility of ex post information sharing under non-cooperative 
R&D, cooperative research (with research taking place in a single lab) is optimal 
∀ 𝜌 𝜖 (0, ρ)Ս( 𝜌, 1) .  
Thus in this case the qualitative result of Marjit (1991) remains unaffected even with 
introduction of ex post information sharing. 
Now assume that cooperative research occurs in both labs. This will be the scenario when  
𝜌(1 − 𝜌) >
𝑅
2𝐵
  (i.e., ρ ϵ  (ρ , ρ)). Then if we compare  𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) and 𝐸(𝐶2), we have 𝐸(𝐶2) =
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2). This means in this case the firms are indifferent between non-cooperative R&D with 
licensing and cooperative R&D with R&D taking place in both labs.   
Proposition 4(b): Given the possibility of technology licensing under non-cooperative R&D,  
if  𝜌(1 − 𝜌) >
𝑅
2𝐵
  i.e., 𝜌 𝜖 (𝜌 , 𝜌), the firms are indifferent between the two R&D organization, 
viz., cooperative R&D (with R&D in both labs) and non-cooperative R&D (with technology 
transfer).  
We are now in a position to compare our results with those of Marjit (1991) and Mukherjee 
and Marjit (2004). 
To see the impact of introducing technology licensing in Marjit (1991) model, first we must 
restrict to the assumption that the size of the innovation is below a critical level (i.e.,  ε < ε0). 
Then we find that when the probability of success in R&D is either high or low, we have similar 
to Marjit (1991) result, that is, cooperative research is preferred to non-cooperative R&D (even 
with the possibility of technology transfer under non-cooperative research), and under this 
situation cooperative research will occur in a single lab. But if the success probability is in the 
intermediate range, non-cooperative R&D is the chosen form of R&D organization in Marjit 
(1991), but in our paper firms are indifferent between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. 
This is completely different result compared to the literature. If it is cooperative R&D, research 
will occur in both labs, and if it is non-cooperative R&D, technology transfer will occur before 
the firms are engaged in product market competition. In Mukherjee and Marjit (2004), 
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however, when cooperative research occurs in both labs, it dominates non-cooperative 
research. It may further be noted that Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) have introduced technology 
transfer in Combs (1992) structure and they have shown that the possibility of technology 
transfer increases the incentive for non-cooperative R&D compared to RJV. In contrast, in our 
paper with the possibility of technology transfer, cooperative research weekly dominates non-
cooperative research for all probabilities of success.   
The above analysis is based on the assumption that under technology licensing the firms can 
write only the fee licensing contract. When both fee and royalty licensing contracts are 
available,12 following Wang (1998), in a homogeneous good duopoly royalty licensing strictly 
dominates fee licensing from the perspective of the innovator, and this is independent of the 
size of the innovation. Therefore, under non-cooperative R&D when firms come up with 
asymmetric technologies, they will write a royalty contract which will generate a larger profit 
to the innovator compared to fee licensing, that is, 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑅) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2), where 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑅) is the 
expected profit of a firm under royalty licensing contract. Therefore, once we include the 
possibility of royalty licensing, we have following changes of the previous results. 
First, when ρ ϵ  (ρ , ρ), we have now 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑅) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) = 𝐸(𝐶2). This means under this 
scenario, firms will certainly go for non-cooperative research. 
Second, when 𝜌 𝜖 (0, 𝜌) Ս ( 𝜌, 1), we have 𝐸(𝐶1) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐶2) (see (12)), but 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑅) >
𝐸(𝑁𝐶2). Hence there can be situations when 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑅) > 𝐸(𝐶1) > 𝐸(𝐶𝑁2) implying that non-
cooperative R&D can be preferred to cooperative R&D when royalty licensing is available. 
Thus when both fee and royalty licensing contracts are available, it is more likely that the firms 
will choose non-cooperative R&D as the optimal R&D organization. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper extends the Marjit (1991) model and discusses the choice between cooperative and 
non-cooperative R&D in the situation when the interacting firms choose optimally the number 
of research lab under R&D cooperation. The paper also considers the possibility of technology 
transfer ex post innovation under non-cooperative R&D. In Marjit (1991) cooperative R&D 
occurs in a single lab hence the firms share both research costs and output. On the other hand, 
                                                          
12 Note that in a homogeneous good duopoly two-part tariff licensing contracts will degenerate to royalty contract 
only, because the optimal fee under two-part tariff licensing contracts will be zero. 
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Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) consider Combs (1992) structure to study the effect of technology 
transfer on the choice of R&D organization assuming that cooperative R&D occurs either in a 
single lab (hence RJV) or in both labs of the firms to prevent the duplication of R&D process. 
In our paper we have derived substantially different results   compared to those in the literature. 
We find that the choice of R&D organization not only depends on the size of investment and 
probability of success in R&D, but also it depends on the size of the innovation. Whether 
research under cooperation will occur in a single lab or in both labs, that depends on success 
probability. Cooperative R&D will occur in a single lab for both low and high probability of 
success, and it will be in both labs if the probability of success belongs to an intermediate 
interval. The possibility of technology transfer arises only when the size of the innovation is 
below a critical level. We have shown that given the possibility of technology transfer under 
non-cooperative R&D and the optimal choice of the form of R&D cooperation, if the 
probability of success is of the intermediate level, the firms are indifferent between these two 
forms of R&D organization, however under cooperation research will occur in both labs; 
otherwise cooperative R&D will dominate, with research in a single lab. In the absence of the 
possibility of technology transfer cooperative R&D will again dominate provided that the size 
of the innovation is below the critical level. When the size of the innovation is above that 
critical level, cooperative R&D will occur only for low and high success probabilities, and for 
the intermediate values of the success probability non-cooperative R&D will occur. While in 
our analysis we have considered fee licensing under technology transfer, we have derived 
implications of the availability of royalty licensing in this context. We have noted, in particular, 
that royalty licensing will tilt the choice towards non-cooperative R&D. 
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